The Future of Health Is Self-Production and Co-Creation Based on Apomediative Decision Support. by Dowie, Jack & Kaltoft, Mette Kjer
Dowie, J; Kaltoft, MK (2018) The Future of Health Is Self-Production
and Co-Creation Based on Apomediative Decision Support. Medical
sciences (Basel, Switzerland), 6 (3). ISSN 2076-3271 DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/medsci6030066
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4649018/
DOI: 10.3390/medsci6030066
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/
medical
sciences
Perspective
The Future of Health Is Self-Production and
Co-Creation Based on Apomediative
Decision Support
Jack Dowie 1,2,* and Mette Kjer Kaltoft 2,3
1 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15–17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH, UK
2 University of Southern Denmark, J.B. Winsløws Vej 9B, 5000 Odense C, Denmark; mkaltoft@health.sdu.dk
3 Odense University Hospital Svendborg, Valdemarsgade 53, 5700 Svendborg, Denmark
* Correspondence: jack.dowie@lshtm.ac.uk; Tel.: +44-7703-963023
Received: 18 July 2018; Accepted: 20 August 2018; Published: 22 August 2018


Abstract: Cultural changes are needed in medicine if the benefits of technological advances are to
benefit healthcare users. The Digital Health Manifesto of ‘medical futurist’ doctor Bertalan Meskó and
‘e-patient’ Dave deBronkart, The Patient Will See You Now by Eric Topol and The Patient as CEO by
Robin Farmanfarmaian, are among the proliferating warnings of the approaching paradigm shift
in medicine, resulting, above all, from technological advances that gives users independent access
to exponentially increasing amounts of information about themselves. We question their messages
only in suggesting they do not sufficiently shift the focus from ‘patient’ to ‘person’ and consequently
fail to recognise the need for the credible, efficient, ethical and independent decision support that
can ensure the ‘democratisation of knowledge’ is person empowering, not overpowering. Such
decision support can ensure the ‘democratisation of decision,’ leading to higher quality decisions
and fully-informed and preference-based consent to health provider actions. The coming paradigm
will therefore be characterised by apomediative (‘direct-to-consumer’) decision support tools, engaged
with by the person in the community to help them make health production decisions for themselves
(including whether to consult a healthcare professional or provider), as well as intermediative
(‘direct-from-clinician’) tools, delivered by a health professional in a ‘shared decision making’
or ‘co-creation of health’ process. This vision paper elaborates on the implementation of these
preference-sensitive decision support tools through the technique of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis.
Keywords: medical futurists; paradigm change; disintermediation; apomediation; intermediation;
patient preferences; decision support tool; decision aid; Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
1. Background: The Future and the Futurists
In this vision paper we take as given that the paradigm change in healthcare envisaged by ‘medical
futurists’ such as doctors Eric Topol [1] and Bertalan Meskó [2] and patients Robin Farmanfarmaian [3]
and Dave deBronkart [4], will happen. We fully endorse their broad diagnoses, prognoses and
‘therapies,’ except in the key respect that is the focus of this paper. There is a crucial omission in all
their analyses, arising from their primary focus on medicine rather than healthcare and on patients
rather than persons. They largely overlook the huge cognitive demands on the person, now able
to access exponentially increasing amounts of information, who wishes to do so without resort to
a health professional, since this is possible only as patient. The person qua person has little or
no support, independent of health professionals, in entering the accessed information—possibly
interesting but decisionally useless as such—into a coherent and appropriate decision framework.
Our authors do not identify the ‘democratisation of decision’ as a necessary condition for the
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announced ‘democratisation of knowledge’ to realise its potential in health. Hence, they fail to
consider person-focused, preference-sensitive decision support tools as essential in their digital future.
To justify these claims requires quoting at some length. We focus initially and mainly on the
Digital Health Manifesto of Meskò and deBronkart [4].
The doctor-patient relationship in healthcare is on the verge of a paradigm shift . . .
For centuries, the dominant paradigm has been that patients do not and cannot know
what needs to be done (or more precisely cannot know anything worth knowing), yet in
story after story, patients today are bringing real value to their own cases, thus “violating the
paradigm-induced expectations that govern” the culture of medicine.
Thomas Kuhn wrote that when too many anomalies accumulate, a field goes into crisis until
a new paradigm is developed and accepted. We assert that this crisis stage has arrived
[in healthcare] but as often happens, the causes of the anomalies are poorly understood,
which leads to confusion and confused reporting. No new paradigm can arise, letting the
field advance, while confusion reigns.
Despite popular belief, disruptive technologies cannot bring change on their own. Social
media, artificial intelligence, robotics, 3D printing, virtual or augmented reality and health
sensors have no effect whatsoever without a change in stakeholders' attitudes and the
structure of the system.
Another dimension arriving but not always welcome, is the reality that patients are gaining
increasing data at home, continuing the time-honoured trends of home thermometers, home
pregnancy tests, insulin test strips, CGMs and so forth. We can barely imagine the next
step in which preliminary diagnoses and prescriptions may be possible. Virtual reality or
augmented reality could bring doctors to patients’ homes (as telemedicine already does),
which will be wonderful for the elderly or remote communities.
Very soon, the old paradigm “medicine is hard; people without medical training have nothing
to offer” will be obsolete but we must work actively to change it among both patients and
clinicians: it prevents most patients from speaking up, asking questions, telling their doctors
their opinions, feelings and experiences—and even if they do, it prevents most doctors from
recognizing the possible value and listening.
As long as the culture of medicine resists doing things differently, progress will be impeded.
We must not construe shortfalls as the fault of technology if the culture hasn’t changed.
In summary, the Manifesto envisages
‘A future where old hierarchies tumble down, the paternalistic patient-doctor relationship
is no longer needed and disruptive technologies enable the democratization of care
by democratizing knowledge. A future where all these are in place due to cultural
transformation facilitated by disruptive technologies. In short, a future where digital health
has fulfilled its potential.’
The Manifesto suggests the move from ‘Traditional Medicine’ to ‘Modern Medicine’ and ‘Digital
e-Health’ involves six fundamental changes:
• Point of Care: from Healthcare facilities to the Patient
• Reference Point: from Population to Individual
• Organising Principle: from Hierarchy to Partnership
• Data Ownership: from Institution to Patient
• Physicians Role: from Authority to Guide
• Knowledge Base: from Ivory Tower of Knowledge to Social Media and Crowdsourcing
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All six of these fundamental shifts are convincingly described, analysed and justified in the
Manifesto and an associated paper with Meskó as lead author [2]. Most, if not all, of the shifts are
relatively uncontroversial in broad and abstract discussions of principle but movements to implement
them in practice remain rare and hotly debated. The walking currently lags far behind the talking.
As self-proclaimed futurists Meskò and deBronkart are in excellent company. From the numerous
candidates for inclusion, we select two: Eric Topol and Robin Farmanfarmaian.
Cardiologist and futurist Eric Topol in The Patient Will See You Now: The Future of Medicine is
on Your Hands [1] argues that the smartphone is ‘the Gutenberg of medicine.’ As summarised by an
anonymous reviewer:
Much as the printing press took learning out of the hands of a priestly class, the mobile
internet is doing the same for medicine, giving us unprecedented control over our healthcare.
With smartphones in hand, we are no longer beholden to an impersonal and paternalistic
system in which ‘doctor knows best.’ Medicine has been digitized, now it will be
democratized. Computers will replace physicians for many diagnostic tasks, citizen science
will give rise to citizen medicine and enormous data sets will give us new means to attack
conditions that have long been incurable. Massive, open, online medicine, where diagnostics
are done by Facebook-like comparisons of medical profiles, will enable real-time, real-world
research on massive populations. There's no doubt the path forward will be complicated:
the medical establishment will resist these changes and digitized medicine inevitably raises
serious issues surrounding privacy. Nevertheless, the result, better, cheaper and more human
health care, will be worth it. [5]
And, elsewhere
We are entering the age of “Do It Yourself” health care, smart phone care, retail care and
cloud-based care. These changes are as disruptive to medicine as eCommerce and Megastores
have been to retail. [6]
Robin Farmanfarmaian, making the case for ‘The Patient as CEO’—and reaching a much wider
public audience through the book that documents her own extraordinary patient journey [3]—sees
us as
. . . on the cusp of a healthcare revolution. From wearable sensors, to improved point-of-care
diagnostics to artificial intelligence and robotics, there are breakthroughs in biomedical
technology on an almost daily basis which are set to fundamentally change the way that
patients interact with their healthcare providers.
Farmanfarmaian aims to ‘show just how rapidly medicine is changing, empowering and enabling
the patient to be a key decision maker’ [3] (p. 23). Patients will no longer be ‘afterthoughts’ or
‘sitting on the sidelines,’ but at the centre of ‘patient-driven’ rather than merely ‘patient-focused’ or
‘patient-centred’ medicine. Instead of being outside the inner circle that makes medical decisions, they
will be dead-centre and they, and/or their carers, will be the ‘CEOs’ of their own healthcare team.
The explicit mention of carers provides an opportunity to emphasise that the presentation of the
future visions in individual terms is not intended to deny or diminish the importance of the role of
families and significant others in healthcare. This importance will vary from culture to culture and
subculture to subculture and the reader is asked to accept, in what follows, that the concept of ‘person’
should be widened as appropriate to the context, for example to embrace the much greater and more
active role of the family in health decision making in many—specifically non-Western—cultures.
While we can endorse the views of all these authors on how the arrival of active and passive
technologies will transform the person’s life both inside their ‘smart home’ and outside it, they have
one major shortcoming.
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2. What’s Missing in All These Future Analyses?
This major shortcoming is ultimately derived from the focus on ‘patient’ rather than ‘person’ and
the failure to follow through the implications of this key ontological distinction. The person-patient
contrast is not ‘merely semantic’—to misuse the latter term in the common way—because the person
qua person, not qua patient, must be at the heart of any coming paradigm change if it is to have real
meaning and impact. While it is now common in the mental health setting to refer to persons rather
than patients, this usage is only slowly diffusing beyond that context and in this respect our futurists
are still in the present.
Meskó and deBronkart provide numerous indications of the ways in which persons will—or
could—take control of and self-produce their own health. However, the fundamental assumption
throughout the Manifesto is that healthcare professionals and providers will always be heavily involved
in the health decision making process, albeit as ‘guide’ rather than ‘authority.’ ‘Co-creation’ of health
by patient and medical professional will be the norm and the future of healthcare is almost completely
equated with the future of medicine. (There is no suggestion, however, that they underestimate the
effect of wider social determinants on the health of individuals and populations, whether ‘health’ and
‘healthcare’ are widely or narrowly defined).
Given this assumption, they are rightly concerned that persons arriving in the clinic to co-create
their health, empowered and equipped by the outputs of new home-based technologies, will pose
major challenges to healthcare professionals and organisations. Current training curricula and practice
arrangements, as well as attitudes, reflect a culture that has not yet acknowledged the inevitably
disruptive effects of citizen-empowering technological change. That technological changes mandate
cultural changes is accordingly the central message of the Manifesto. Attempts to absorb these innovative
technologies into the current culture—as just new ways to do old things—are doomed to fail and the
blame will be improperly placed on the technology not fitting into the status quo culture, rather than
the culture not changing to enable the benefits of the technology to be realised.
Susannah Fox, Chief Technology Officer at the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
acknowledges it is a little odd that her background is in anthropology, not technology. But, she says:
We’re living through this time right now where technology is a Trojan Horse for
change. We say technology but we mean innovation. We say interoperability and
open data but we mean culture change. And this is why the HHS CTO is an
anthropologist. I know about culture change. I know how difficult it is for everyone
involved. (http://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/hhs-cto-technology-healthcare-
trojan-horse-culture-change)
However, in calling for cultural change, the Manifesto authors underestimate the massive material
interests embedded in the present paradigm, in the form of personal and collective capital, both
financial and professional. These material interests underpin the resistance to change which most often
manifests itself in the broad claim that the suggested changes, while appealing in principle, will not be
in the true interests of our patients in practice.
The new paradigm must therefore go even further than the disruptive future envisaged by
Meskó and deBronkart, certainly beyond changes in encounter ‘communication’ and ‘shared decision
making’ practices, even where these are substantive and not superficial. It must involve the creation of
genuinely independent resource bases for person-driven health production and co-creation, accessible
and delivered ‘direct-to-consumer/user/person/citizen.’
Following Eysenbach [7], we refer to these resources as ‘apomediative,’ because they ‘stand by’
the person but ‘away from’ (apo-) and independent of the provider of the good or service in question.
Familiar examples of apomediative services are product and service comparison websites, such as
‘Which’ in the UK and ‘Taenk’ in Denmark. Apomediation is distinguished from ‘intermediation,’
where the provider decides what to tell the person on the basis of their perceived needs and requests
and their own ability to deliver on options. Intermediation is therefore not provider-independent and
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options may be censored or filtered on the basis of the provider’s beliefs, values, or interests.’ Without
being a requirement to access the product or service, apomediative resources and tools seek to help
the person avoid such censoring and filtering and provide relevant and high quality independent
guidance. In the other direction, apomediation is also distinguished from ‘disintermediation,’ where
the person attempts to find what they want, or think they want, without any help, for example by
doing an internet search.
The apomediative resources must include decision support, not just information support.
Information alone cannot make a decision and information support is not decision support. Decision
support requires showing how any information can be incorporated explicitly into a decision
framework, making its impact observable and explorable.
In the light of this, the most significant aspect of the Manifesto is that two key words never
appear: ‘decision’ and preference.’ While there are occasional implicit references to both, their absence
reflects the central omission from the Manifesto, which is any mention of personalised preference-sensitive
decision support tools, engaged with by the person in the community. Such tools are essential to provide the
decision support based on the rapidly expanding range of self-sourcible inputs, including information
obtainable from personal electronic health records. These tools will not only equip the person with
increased competency in the self-production of their health but also enhance their ability to arrive at
any subsequent co-creation encounter empowered decisionally, not merely informationally.
Farmanfarmaian and Topol, in documenting the contribution of new technologies to information
generation and processing, fail to remedy this omission in the Manifesto by recognising and highlighting
what the new digital technologies have to offer to decision making, the end use of information generation
and processing. The absence of serious attention to preferences is noteworthy in their works also.
Repeatedly emphasising that ‘knowledge is power,’ there is no explicit recognition in
Farmanfarmaian’s work that decisions require value-based preference judgements, as well as the
knowledge and information which need to be integrated with them in decision making. Preferences
are equally absent in Topol. While he may not himself have been responsible for the comprehensive
14-page index to his book, it is notable in not containing either the words ‘decision’ or ‘preference/s,’
let alone ‘decision aid’ or ‘decision support.’
In summary, in contrast to these fellow futurists, we argue that preference-sensitive, analytical
decision support tools are essential if the person is to cope with and benefit from, the outputs of the
new digital technologies—determining which of their informational outputs will be relevant inputs,
as well as integrating them with their personal preferences in decision making.
Knowledge is only potential power: it empowers only when it is fitted into a coherent
decision-making process. The ‘democratisation of decision’ is essential to yield the health and wider
benefits of the ‘democratisation of knowledge.’ This was recognised by WHO in its 1998 endorsement of
empowerment as the process by which people gain greater control over decisions affecting their health
and the Aarhus Convention adopted three years later made public participation in decision making in
environmental matters a human right issue (http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html).
Apomediative personalised decision support tools built within Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
are the vehicle for this ultimate democratisation. This paper elaborates on the implementation of these
preference-sensitive decision support tools through the technique of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis.
3. Decisional Relationships and Apomediation
The concepts of ‘apomediative’ and ‘intermediative’ decision support, based on the ideas of
Gunter Eysenbach, provide the most helpful framework for addressing the main issues arising in the
future roles and relationships of persons and healthcare professionals [7,8]. Figure 1 sets out the main
possibilities for the relationship and types of decision support diagrammatically.
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Figure 1. Taxonomy of alternative types of disintermediation, apomediation and inter ediation.
We now elaborate on each element of the taxonomy, starting from the top:
3.1. Non-Mediative Decision Support
The person accepts to be treated as a patient by a health professional, without any use of a decision
support tool and to receive no explicit decision support other than that provided by the clinician in
a standard consultation—which might be zero in ‘paternalistic’ medicine. The decision is taken for
them, maybe with their complete agreement.
3.2. Disintermediative Decision Support
For some reason, perhaps dis atisfaction with non-mediative non-support as pati nt, the
person bypasses health care professionals and providers and anonymously consults health-related
resources ai l , ssi ly also some sort of ‘decis on support tool,’ though t is will not
be one produced by an authorised h alt c re professional rganisation, or by an indepe nt health
decision analysis institute.
3.3. Non-Professional Intermediative Decision Support
The person enrols voluntarily for health-related support mainly information but possibly
including also a ‘decision support tool.’ Again, these will not be ones produced by an authorised
healthcare professional organisation, or by an in e en e t ealt ecisi l sis i tit t .
3.4. Intermediative Decision Support
The person accepts to be treated as a patient by a clinician who directs the encounter using
an Intermediative Personalised Decision Support Tool (INTER PDST). Healthwise Decision Aids
(https://www.healthwise.org) and Option Grids are examples. Some of these INTER PDSTs are
publicly available, for example, Mayo Cards (http://centerforinnovation.mayo.edu/decision-aids)
but many are available only through a healthcare provider on a commercial basis. Option Grids have
recently moved from public access to access only via providers (https://health.ebsco.com/products/
option-grid).
Med. Sci. 2018, 6, 66 7 of 15
It is characteristic of most INTER PDSTs that they do not produce an opinion as to the best option
or options and are designed and delivered with the aim of helping the patient to ‘make up their mind’
by whatever process they will use to do this.
3.5. Pure Apomediative Decision Support
An apomediative Personalised Decision Support Tool (APO PDST) assists the person in the
community to
1. Make an informed and preference-based decision on whether to consult a Health Professional or
provider, based on the opinion emerging from the tool
2. Prepare themselves for a professional consultation which they intend to arrange, or have already
arranged, thereby coming to it empowered with the opinion generated by the tool. At arrival,
there are four possibilities:
(i) Pure apomediative route 1: the consultation follows the standard deliberative reasoning
form and proceeds to a decision with little or no explicit reference to the tool by the person
(ii) Pure apomediative route 2: the person requests that the clinician observes the output from
the tool but does not ask them to engage with it online
(iii) Pure apomediative route 3: the person requests that the apomediative tool is accessed
as in-clinic apomediation, the clinician providing only ‘technical’ assistance in this
engagement, not intermediative support
(iv) Blended apomediative-intermediative route (see Section 3.7): the person requests that the
apomediative tool is opened and engaged with jointly by both parties in the consultation,
transforming it into a two-way apomediative -intermediative tool
A key characteristic of an APO PDST is that it is publicly accessible to any person in the community,
whether or not they are currently labelled a ‘patient’ in the relevant area of healthcare. It is a
‘direct-to-consumer/user/citizen/person’ resource. If a person wishes to access the tool through
an encrypted patient portal, this is possible if a relevant app exists that provides secure access to it.
It goes without saying that individuals will differ in whether and the extent to which, they
wish to engage with home-based decision support in the form of APO PDSTs. That is why their
informed consent to engage needs to be sought at the outset. This is particularly important because
the simple experiencing of apomediative support is likely to have a value-clarifying, perhaps even
value-constructing, effect. This reflective process, always raising the possibility of preference change,
is likely to continue in any subsequent clinical encounter with a health professional.
3.6. Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis-Based Apomediative Decision Support
If Apomediative Personalised Decision Support Tools (APO PDSTs) are to meet the twin goals
of preference-sensitive decisions and an informed and preference-based consent, we argue that the
strongest analytical basis is provided by value-based, compensatory Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
(MCDA). (Other versions of MCDA which are either ranking-based or non-compensatory fail key
requirements for preference-sensitive decision support). Intermediative aids (INTER PDSTs) will
usually be multi-criterial but if they are not built in a transparent and theoretically-grounded technique
such as MCDA, they will struggle to meet these twin requirements.
The essence of an APO PDST is that all the personalising inputs must be self-sourcible in the
community, including information from the person’s Electronic Health Record (EHR) if it is accessible.
The default evidence- and expertise-based ratings come pre-installed in the tool, along with the criteria
and options.
The brief illustration of an APO PDST provided here is for the statin decision: Should I go,
or not go, to my general practitioner to discuss taking statins? To engage with the tool, go to https:
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//goo.gl/H7P51r. Figure 2 is an illustrative screen capture for a 60-year-old male smoker with a
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Figure 2. Final screen capture for Statin decision, reflecting pre-entered and supplied Ratings
and Weightings.
The APO PDST involves the person:
• completing an online instrument to obtain an estimate of their personalised risks of All-Cause
and Cardiovascular Mortality in the next ten years
• self-assessing their blood pressure and total cholesterol level, which are the two inputs required,
along with age, sex and smoking status, to complete the E roSCORE-based instrument
• self-rating the treatment burden of statins (in respec of bu den ratings th re may lso be inputs
rom significant others, such as family and other carers, or caregivers if in a cared-for facility)
•
ti ).
his P S includes ll- ause ortality as ell as ortality, because the authors of the
underlying paper [9] rightly stress that exclusive use of a condition-specific cause of mortality (such as
CVD), gives the misleading impression that the person is immortal if they do not die from that condition.
This paper was chosen partly because it includes this key criterion. However, any paper which reports
the effect of alternative options on multiple criteria can be the basis of such an MCDA-based P ST,
making these tools excellent vehicles for the translation of research findings into ‘bedside’ decision
making. Numerous examples of such translation can be found at cafeannalisa.org.uk. We have shown
elsewhere how uncertainty can be introduced into an MCDA-based PDST [10].
The ‘opinion’ from an APO PDST is never to be regarded as a medical opinion. However,
being based on data well beyond that held by any individual health professional, using multiple
criteria and being preference-sensitive, it could potentially be superior to a medical opinion for the
person concerned.
3.7. Apomediative-Intermediative Decision Support
As suggested earlier, the person who has engaged with the APO PDST in the community may
request that the health professional opens it in the consulta ion, in order that it can be used in a
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modified version of intermediation. This use is very much facilitated by the fact that it is already
populated with the inputs from the person, that is, their criterion Weightings and their performance
Ratings for the criteria where they are the expert, par excellence Treatment Burden.
In such blended ‘apo-intermediation,’ however, the clinician agrees to engage with the person
in a way that is different—less controlling—from that which characterises the pure intermediative
mode. This is symbolized in Figure 1 by the two-way intermediation arrow, compared with the
one-way arrow in pure intermediation. For example, the clinicians will now need to be prepared to
discuss options that are in the APO PDST that has been re-opened but may have been censored in the
equivalent pure INTER PDST.
The professional is able to change a Rating in the opened APO-INTER PDST, where they believe
they have a superior, more personalised, knowledge to that reflected in the APO tool. (This change is
recorded by the program in a weblog). They may delete options on the basis of contraindications not
known to the person but should not do so on the grounds of local restrictions or guidelines. (In contrast,
they may and will often be doing this in delivering an INTER PDST). They can also add options but
only on condition that they supply their personal performance Ratings for this option on all the criteria,
except Respondent-rated criteria such as Treatment Burden. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that
each and every Rating cell in the PDST requires a Best Estimate Available Now (BEAN).
Whether the tool is used in pure Apomediative or Apo-Inter form, it is important that engagement
with it is not interrupted by any wider discussion of the decision that will be taken in the deliberative
phase that is assumed to follow engagement with the tool (see far right of Figure 1). The validity
of the opinion of the tool requires that it be delivered free from contamination. Ratings adjustment
by the professional in Apo-Inter mode is not contamination. Changes of Weightings prompted
by the autonomous person’s continuing reflection on and evolution of, their personal values and
preferences—begun in the apomediative phase—are to be expected and encouraged. However, changes
of Weightings prompted solely by the professional’s insertion of a ‘better’ set for this person, are
contamination. Clinicians find this sort of interference in decision aid delivery hard to resist, even
when they have committed to avoiding it [11,12].
The value of the PDST does not depend on the relationship of the opinion of the tool—post
professional adjustment, if any—and the final decision. The opinion of the tool is defined as the
complete set of option Scores, not just the ‘winner.’ The latter can only become a medical opinion if the
clinician agrees with it.
4. The Future of ‘Shared Decision Making’
Where does the concept of ‘Shared Decision Making’ (SDM) fit into this envisioned future?
Where the APO DST is used to decide whether or not to consult a healthcare professional and the
decision is not to do so, the question of SDM or ‘co-creation’ of health does not arise. Where a
pure INTER PDST is used, the precise nature and extent of SDM is indeterminate but is heavily
loaded in the clinician’s favour in all respects. Where an APO PDST is used correctly in either
Apomediative or Apo-Intermediative mode, there is necessarily extensive role-specific sharing in the
process of decision-making. The Weightings and Treatment Burden Ratings are those of the person,
while the Ratings are the Evidence- and/or Expert-based BEANs, possibly adjusted by the delivering
professional on the basis of their local expertise or greater information about the particular person.
(Note that this extra and valid information may change the BEANs without ‘flipping the DST opinion.’
This will especially be the case if the changes apply to a criterion that is lowly-weighted by the person).
A deliberative phase is assumed to follow delivery of the tool and the extent to which this deals
fairly and transparently with the opinion of the PDST—either pure APO or APO-INTER—is a matter
for the decision dyad. We stress that the decision is the person’s alone and in no way can be shared, even
if mutually agreed. Aspects of the decision-making process can be shared in the deliberative phase and
we believe that the person will be significantly empowered by the PDST in this final phase and this
should positively affect the score on any Shared Decision-Making metric. More important, they can be
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expected to rate the eventual decision as of higher quality, using an appropriate dually-personalised
formative instrument such as MyDecisionQuality (MDQ) [13].
The Achilles heel of conventional clinical medicine lies in its failure to separate ‘evidence’ from
‘values’ in an explicitly analytical and transparent way, a necessary condition for preference-sensitive
person-centred care in a population with heterogeneous preferences. The same failure characterises
the conventional ‘evidence base’ and guidelines, both of which seek to provide general conclusions
and recommendation about options, inevitably based on average patients [14]. Almost universally
applauded within the current paradigm, BMJ Rapid Reviews (https://www.bmj.com/rapid-
recommendations) could be seen less positively as an attempt to avoid genuine person-driven
preference-sensitive decision support at the point of care [15]. In the face of a ‘strong recommendation’
from such a source, it is unlikely a fully-informed and preference-based consent can be given by
the person, because their personal preferences will neither be elicited formally, nor synthesised
with the best available evidence/estimates for all options (established separately) in an explicit and
transparent way.
5. Who Will Be the Apomediators?
In the coming ‘patient’-free paradigm, it will become evident that (a) Healthcare Analysis is not
Healthcare and (b) a Healthcare Decision Analysis Professional is not a Healthcare Professional. And
vice versa, in both cases.
The Healthcare Decision Analysis Professional is the appropriate person to perform the role of
apomediator, since they are independent of the Healthcare Professional. The latter has increased
information about the individual person, which may add to decision quality post apomediation but
this advantage can easily be outweighed by material interests, professional obligations, organisational
responsibilities and personal values, all of which threaten the delivery of genuine person-centred
decision support.
Apomediative tools must therefore be provided through an organisation or institute that can
offer, across the entire healthcare context, authoritative APO PDSTs, equivalent to that provided by
Which, Taenk and Choice for other consumer goods and services. They will, however, offer analytical
possibilities that go beyond those of such consumer organisations, to incorporate online interactive
personalised preference-sensitive evaluations. The institute must be completely independent of pharma
(http://medicalconsumerism.blogspot.co.uk), governments, professional guidelines and health service
providers, since all have conflicts arising from pursuing their financial, political, organisational and/or
professional interests and objectives. These conflicts go well beyond the conventionally reported
ones—patchily reported according to the patient decision aid survey by Elwyn, et al. [16]—and
extend to the deeper and long-standing concerns of critics such as Ivan Illich and George Bernard
Shaw [17–19]. In instinctively opposing the creation of independent institutions of the required sort,
health professionals and organisations would be well-advised to play the ‘trust card’ with great caution,
because of the increasing public awareness of the conflicts and biases involved in the status quo.
A vital role for clinicians remains in the future but it will not be the type of partnership
with patients envisaged by Shared Decision-Making advocates, including Meskó and deBronkart,
Farmanfarmaian and Topol. The future of healthcare will be person-driven not provider-driven. The
informational asymmetry underlying the principal-agent relationship of the current paradigm has
disappeared with the ‘democratisation of knowledge.’ But this will be a superficial and unsustainable
advance until it is followed by the ‘democratisation of decision.’ Note that it is democratisation of
decision not democratisation of decision making. While the decision-making process can be shared, the
decision itself cannot. The decision can be mutually agreed but it can be owned only by the person,
or their non-professional proxy.
Apomediator’s competencies are in analysis, not care. They will leave the care to those with
the competency to deliver care, which is completely separate from competency to decide what care (testing
and/or treatment) is in the best interest of the person. Reluctance to accept this distinction between
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analysis and care is a sign of adherence to the current medical culture which fails to differentiate them.
This reluctance frequently morphs into biased characterisations of transparent, quantitative decision
analytical processes as ‘reductionist,’ ‘dehumanizing’ and ‘cookbook.’ Coming from people who have
zero acquaintance with them, they can be expected to disappear with the paradigm that harbours
such prejudices.
Decision makers (e.g., medical doctors) will in future need to show they can improve on the
opinion of an APO PDST, not simply assume and assert that they can. The results from the most
relevant studies shows that this will be extremely difficult, as the work of Paul Meehl established long
ago in the clinical versus actuarial controversy [20]:
When you are pushing 90 investigations, predicting everything from the outcome of football
matches to the diagnosis of liver disease and when you can hardly come up with half a
dozen studies showing even a weak tendency in favour of the clinician, it is time to draw
a practical conclusion, whatever theoretical differences may still be disputed . . . If I try to
forecast something important about a college student, or a criminal, or a depressed patient
by inefficient rather than efficient means, meanwhile charging this person or the taxpayer
10 times as much money as I would need to achieve greater predictive accuracy, that is not
sound ethical practice. That it feels better, warmer and cuddlier to me as predictor is a shabby
excuse indeed. [20] (p. 374)
It is unlikely that health care professionals can be apomediators, wearing two hats. In order to
become a formal part of the development of apomediative decision support tools for the person, health
care professionals would have to give up their membership of the medical community, because of the
conflicts of interest it creates: no loyalty or commitment, either personal or professional, to principles
or to authorities, can be allowed to interfere with the independent generation of the apomediative
product. In any case, most clinicians will lack and would need to acquire, the necessary decision
analytic competence and sub-competencies in epidemiology and other relevant methodologies. These
shortcomings and the exclusion of serious attention to analytical decision making in medical curricula,
are not accidental. They reflect the un-evidence-based faith in intuitive reasoning, tacit knowledge and
‘reflective practice,’ none of which (despite their undoubted existence) will be able to survive, in their
current form, in the transparent paradigm that is coming.
If clinicians choose to remain inside the conventional practice box, they will be (as Meskò and
deBronkart warn) increasingly annoyed by their encounters, especially with APO PDST-empowered
patients who are not willing to switch into intermediative mode. Their claims to ‘tacit knowledge’ will
be treated with scepticism unless and until it can be externalized in a decision model. Tacit knowledge
is knowledge but it can only be a contributor to a personalised decision support tool if it can improve
the BEANs in an explicit Ratings matrix, which means it has to be ‘published’ and no longer be tacit.
The upside for medicine is that by devolving decision responsibility, physicians can rid themselves
of the burden of choosing the ‘right’ therapy and bearing the consequences. Accepting their limited
but important role in the co-creation of the health of the person, on the basis of apomediative decision
support tools used apo-intermediatively (perhaps via tele-medicine), will constitute a win-win for
both parties. Providing empathy and the human touch will be the essence of the future care provided
by healthcare professionals. That is not something which an APO PDST can deliver, even though it
should provide opt-ins and links to support of kinds that go beyond its focus on decision making. That
must always remain its unremitting primary focus—and sole justification.
6. Is the Future Already Here? ‘Realistic Medicine’ in Scotland
Catherine Calderwood, on taking up the position of Chief Medical Officer, launched ‘Realistic
Medicine’ as the way forward for medical care in Scotland. Her promotion of it as the way to better
Shared Decision Making is now in its third year [21]. The objectives—and anticipated benefits—are
clear from the sentiments expressed throughout her 3rd Annual Report.
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Practicing Realistic Medicine requires care that is coproduced in partnership with the people
receiving it—person-centred, holistic care . . . We must move away from the “Doctor knows
best” culture and generate supportive environments where people truly feel comfortable
asking questions about their care and can expect to get clear answers . . . A key part of
shared decision making is honesty and realism about possible outcomes; recognising the
benefits but also the risks and limitations of treatment in the context of the patients’ life and
what matters most to them . . . People must be empowered to discuss their treatment fully
with their healthcare providers including the possibility that a suggested treatment might
come with side effects—or even negative outcomes. Everyone should feel able to ask their
doctor why they have suggested a test, treatment or procedure and all decisions about a
person’s care should be made together . . . We know that people want to be more involved
in decisions about their care, yet they may not know what to ask, or feel that they don’t
have “permission” to participate in the decision-making process . . . We know that patients
express more satisfaction during consultations where they have been able to express their
perspective and objectives—what matters most to them . . . . Not only are people more likely
to have greater confidence in reaching decisions through this person-centred approach but
there is evidence that adherence to treatment is improved as well as patients experiencing
less regret about treatment choices.
However, it is clear from the extracts above that Realistic Medicine mainly involves correcting
aspects of current practice that are ethically unacceptable in normal, let alone ‘person-centred,’ care.
We also read:
While professionals will be used to engaging in discussions about informed consent, going
a step further by asking about the person’s perspective, health beliefs and preferences is a
highly skilled interaction.
The suggestion that informed consent can be discussed, even obtained, without asking about the
person’s perspective, health beliefs and preferences, is worrying, even if the desired consent does not
approach the ’perfected’ informed level advocated by Nelson and Clay [22].
So, it is clear that the future is not already here and will not be, even if the goals of Realistic
Medicine are fully realised. Focusing on the basics of honest communication between clinician and
patient on both information and preferences, Realistic Medicine might be seen as, at best, making the
case for clinician-developed and delivered intermediative decision aids. It shows no awareness of
the possibility of apomediative decision support tools, or the role they could play in empowering the
person—the person who can come to the clinical encounter with a preliminary opinion that ensures
they are well-equipped to participate in the conversation and give truly informed and preference
based consent to any future action. The person will then drive the Shared Decision Making, including
agreeing to segue into apo-intermediative mode.
7. The Person Is Also a Citizen
Seeking to avoid the fundamental conflict between person-centred care and policy-level decisions
based on effectiveness and/or cost-effectiveness is as doomed as the hunt for the mythical Snark [23].
The person is also a citizen and, in a resource-constrained, publicly-funded system must simply
endorse the principle of cost-effectiveness on ethical as well as efficiency grounds. Each person must
count equally in person-centred care, so the opportunity cost of using resources on any one person
must impact on clinical decisions, as well as the higher-level allocation ones.
This does not mean that it is ethical for the person to be treated as a means to achieve some policy
end—to reduce the incidence of this, increase the uptake of that—even if it is in their perceived individual
best interests. If the person’s ‘undesirable’ preferences reflect their socioeconomic and cultural contexts,
which they may well do, it is these which need to be addressed directly, not worked-around by
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delivering public health via a clinical medicine that is not person-centred. A bottom-up approach of
bringing the person’s decisions into the formulation of the policy goals, through preference-sensitive
support that uses the best available estimates of multi-criterial effectiveness, is the way forward.
MCDA-based decision support is as valuable at the group policy-level as at the individual decision
one [24].
It is also important to stress that the individual can only self-produce their health and co-create it
with healthcare professionals, within their biological givens, the wider environment, socioeconomic
constraints and conditions in which they live and work. As the Meikirch model asserts
Health is a state of wellbeing emergent from conducive interactions between individuals’
potentials, life’s demands and social and environmental determinants . . . Health occurs
when individuals use their biologically given and personally acquired potentials to manage
the demands of life in a way that promotes well-being. This process continues throughout
life and is embedded within related social and environmental determinants of health. [25]
(pp. 363, 369)
There are therefore grave dangers in overstating the extent to which health is determined through
individual healthcare, rather than at the community and higher levels. Most of the recent advances in
key health indicators (e.g., life expectancy) are attributable to sectors other than healthcare, so that
health needs to be approached within a much wider and comprehensive policy portfolio. Equitable
and cost-effective cross-sectoral public health policies are an essential complement to the present
restricted vision of the future.
8. Conclusions: Back to the Futurists
Robin Farmanfamaian and e-patient Dave deBronkart are individuals who have drawn on
their stressful experiences prior to diagnosis and during their continuing journey as patients. Their
highlighting of ‘patient’ is fully explained by the painful facts of their life experiences. Berci Meskò
is a healthcare professional who, via Webicina (http://webicina.com) has, for many years, curated
evidence/literature from the entire range of professional and social media relevant to patients and
health professionals in multiple languages. He is now using himself as a test-bed to explore all
the wearables and other self-sourced inputs that can improve healthcare provision. Eric Topol is
a world-renowned clinician, as well as innovator and communicator about the way in which new
technologies require the ‘creative destruction’ of medicine as we know it [26].
As emphasised earlier, it is only in one respect that we seek to add value to their major
contributions. Re-focusing on the person rather than the patient will heighten the awareness in
all parties of the new analytical decision support competencies that are required, by both persons and
professionals, to turn the ‘information explosion’ into more and better health. In our view, Multi-Criteria
Decision Analysis is the best vehicle for moving into this future and, as a completely different technique
from clinical reasoning, it encapsulates the need for cultural change in medicine and medical training
that goes far beyond the greater IT literacy and computer competence it requires.
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